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ABSTRACT
The 2004 Arizona Water Settlements Act (AWSA) is the current standard for what a 
comprehensive, negotiated settlement can achieve in terms of water rights reallocation, water 
resource management, and water supply reliability enhancement. This note reviews the flows of 
money and water specified in Titles I and II of the AWSA to identify the signatory and non-
signatory parties that benefit from the settlement and the allocation of costs between the various 
parties to the agreement. Opportunity costs are also considered. Innovative elements of the 
agreement are discussed particularly those that improve water supply reliability for the Gila River 
Indian Community and third parties. The central roles of water resource management tools and 
market mechanisms in the AWSA are also discussed. 
1. INTRODUCTION
The location of the Gila River Indian Community (GRIC) reservation on the southern border of 
Phoenix, a mega-city with two of the ten fastest cities in America 2 and the risk to non-Indian 
water users in the state inherent in the Community’s 1.8 million acre feet (MAF) Gila River 
Adjudication claim provided impetus for the AWSA. Implicit in any legal proceedings is 
uncertainty. This negotiated settlement removed these risks and also resolved the allocation of 
Central Arizona Project (CAP) water between Indian and non-Indian uses. The resolution of these 
allocation issues also settled a long standing dispute over the repayment of the CAP and 
numerous disputes between the GRIC and water providers and users in the state. The size of the 
settlement in terms of water and cost and the number of signatories to it are indicators of the 
importance of this agreement and the motivation to research the elements of the settlement.
The AWSA contains four Titles, they are the: Central Arizona Project Settlement, Gila River 
Indian Community Water Rights Settlement, Southern Arizona Water Rights Settlement, and the 
San Carlos Apache Tribe Water Rights Settlement. The focus of this note is the first two Titles. 
The main points of these settlements are described and the economic implications are elaborated. 
An 1859 Act of Congress created the initial Gila River Indian Reservation in what is the Gila 
River watershed. It was enlarged seven times over the next 56 years to include a small area within 
the Salt River watershed. The current reservation is 372,000 acres (see Map 1). The priority of the 
Community’s water rights, as per the Winters Doctrine is 1859.3 Although the doctrine 
establishes Federal reserved water rights, they remained unquantified. The risk when water rights 
are unquantified are several: the pending claims themselves are unprotected against future 
competing water rights claims, and the claims pose a risk to current and future water use in the 
affected region. The GRIC reservation lies at the bottom of two watershed s at the confluence of 
the Gila and Salt Rivers. This geography has meant that their water access has been subject to 
diminishment from the development of water rights upstream in the Gila River watershed, and to 
1This research was supported by Sustainability of semi-Arid Hydrology and Riparian Areas (SAHRA), a 
National Science Foundation, Science and Technology Center. I would like to thank my advisor Dr. Bonnie 
G. Colby, Katharine Jacobs and several regional water experts for their input. Thanks also to Nancy 
Bannister for creating the Arizona map.
2 Gilbert is the fourth and Chandler the seventh fastest growing cities in the US, U.S. Census Bureau, 2005.
3 Winters v. United States 207 U.S. 564 (1908) found that tribes have reserved water rights appurtenant to 
reservation lands to fulfill the purpose of reservation as a homeland. The date of these implicit water rights 
is the date of the establishment of the reservation.
2a lesser extent, in the Salt River watershed. From the early 1870s two large irrigation districts 4
upstream of the reservation diverted water from the Gila River impacting downstream availability 
for the Community. To address growing water access issues the U.S. Congress in 1924 authorized 
the construction of the Coolidge Dam and San Carlos Irrigation Project (SCIP) to supply 
irrigation water for 50,000 acres on the GRIC Reservation. A year later the United States on 
behalf of the Community and San Carlos Irrigation and Drainage District (SCIDD) sued upstream 
water users to establish the water rights of the Community. After ten years of litigation, the Globe
Equity decree5 entitled the GRIC to divert 300 KAFY (thousand acre feet per year) from the Gila 
River. Despite the decree, these higher priority water rights were not enforced and disputes over 
the provisions resulted in decades-long-litigation between GRIC and other water users, litigation 
that has been resolved by the AWSA.6
Map 1: Arizona’s Indian Reservations and Rivers
4
 Water rights were developed in the Safford Valley and the Duncan-Virden Valley, which correspond to 
current day Gila Valley Irrigation District and Franklin Irrigation District. At the same time the 
downstream Florence-Case-Grande area, present day San Carlos Irrigation and Drainage District, was also 
developed. 
5
 Globe Equity Decree shall mean the decree dated June 29, 1935 entered in United States of America v. 
Gila Valley Irrigation District, Globe Equity No. 59, et al., in the United States District Court for the 
District of Arizona.
6
 Pub. L. 108-451
3A second set of GRIC water claims are centered on the Salt River watershed. The reservation 
enlargement in 1879 added the lands farmed by Maricopa Colony to the GRIC Reservation. This 
branch of the GRIC irrigated around 1,000 acres of land from the Salt River. Again development 
of non-Indian agriculture challenged the prior rights of the Community and again the United 
States sued these water users on behalf of the Community. This litigation began in 1901 and in 
1903 United States v. Haggard adjudicated the Community’s right to irrigate 1,080 acres from the 
Salt River (equivalent to around 5.9 KAFY). This decree was incorporated into the 1917 Benson-
Allison decree which adjudicated water rights for the Community near the confluence of the Gila 
and Salt rivers.
These water rights adjudicated in the early 1900s fall far short of the 1.8 MAF7 GRIC claim in the 
Gila River Adjudication proceedings. This claim was formulated based on the Practicably 
Irrigable Acreage (PIA) standard articulated by the courts in Arizona v. California.8 This standard 
quantifies Winters rights by determining the amount of water necessary to irrigate all practicably 
irrigable acreage within the reservation. This formulaic standard is not without its flaws9 and an 
alternative recently articulated by the Arizona Supreme Court is the homeland test.10 This 
doctrine allows tribes to prosecute for water to meet their future needs. Permitted water uses 
explicit in the homeland test include water for population growth, the environment, community 
development, industry, and recreation. As with tribal water rights quantified through PIA, the 
development of these tribal water uses can pose a threat to junior water rights holders in an over-
allocated watershed. 
Regardless of which legal doctrine on quantification is applied, the Community’s claims 
remained an exceptional risk for the viability and future development of the central valley cities
and also the rest of the state. Many believed that the GRIC had a very strong reserved right claim
based on their location at the confluence of two rivers, a documented history of irrigated 
agriculture, and large tracts of irrigable and developable land on the reservation. Other regional 
water users were concerned that the Community might also have a strong ability to limit
significant groundwater pumping near the reservation boundary. Given this exposure, the 
surrounding cities were primed for settlement. Furthermore, excess Colorado River water was 
available for reallocation to the Community: this water will in practice replace a block of Globe 
Equity Decree (Gila River) water (without this ‘exchange’ the water rights of non-Indian 
agriculture and municipalities in the Gila River watershed would have to be reduced). Finally, an 
agreement was bolstered by the Community’s acceptance of water leasing.11 The outcome of 
multi-party negotiations, the AWSA, not only provides benefits for non-Indian water users whose 
water rights remain undiminished (or will be compensated) but also for the Community. The
agreement substitutes delivered ‘wet’ Colorado River water and provides funds to develop its use
and management. The settlement incorporates a number of water management innovations that 
should improve water supply reliability for the Community, and for others reliant on the Gila 
River watershed and its tributaries.
7
 A water right of 1.8 MAF would have reallocated a quarter of the State’s current water supplies (7.24 
MAF, ADWR, 2006) to one tribe and concurrently severely impacted non-Indian water rights holders.
8
 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
9
 Dana Smith, Note, Doctrinal Anachronism?: Revisiting the Practicably Irrigable Acreage Standard in 
Light of International Law for the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 22 (3) ARIZ. JNL of INTL & COMPTVE 
LAW. 712-713 (2005).
10
 In re the Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 35 P/3d68, 79 
(Ariz. 2001).
11
 Pub. L. 108-451, Title II, Sec. 205(a)(2). 
4Another aspect of settlements is economic. The core of many of the 16 Federal criteria12 for 
Indian water rights settlements relates to allocating costs based on benefits, maintaining status 
quo in watersheds, promoting efficiency, and removing risk and uncertainty, by attaining past, 
present and future waivers of water rights,13 (and waiving claims for water quality14 and 
subsidence damages).15 It is also the policy of the Federal government that the federal 
contributions to a settlement may not exceed the "calculable legal exposure".16
This note examines the costs and benefits of Titles I and II of the agreement not only as an 
accounting exercise, but also as a means to understand the motivation for 35 signatories17 to and 
the 85 plus side agreements attached to the settlement. Other than the large number of side 
agreements, there is another clue that it was these players who were the main drivers for the 
settlement: there are no explicit Federal penalties owed by the federal government to GRIC 
associated with the repeal of Titles I and II of AWSA, if the parties do not meet the enforceability 
date.18 First the Titles I and II are introduced: the settlement of the Central Arizona Project 
(CAP)19 repayment and allocation between Federal and non-federal uses, CAP M&I (municipal 
and industrial) reallocation to the Phoenix valley cities, water for the tribes, and the proliferation 
of side agreements that are exhibits to the main settlement. Then the water management 
implications and water supply reliability outcomes of the settlement are discussed before 
concluding remarks on what lessons other tribes and states can learn from the comprehensive 
AWSA legislation.
2. THE AWSA
While the AWSA is not quite as comprehensive as its name suggests, within the CAP three 
county service area20 and the Gila River watershed it resolved major uncertainties. This is no 
coincidence. Just over half of Arizona’s allocation of Colorado River water21 is delivered by the 
federally-funded CAP.22 This ‘new’, renewable water boosts intra-state water supplies of 5.825
12 See, 33 Fed. Reg. 9223 (1990). 
13
 Pub. L. 108-451, Title II Sec 207(a)(1)(A)-(B) and (F)-(G) for claims against the Salt River Project 
(SRP), and Id. Sec 207 (a)(3)-(5) for waivers against the Community, the U.S. and the Upper Gila Valley, 
respectively.
14
 Exceptions from this blanket waiver of rights to remediation for water quality injury are 44 potential and 
documented contamination sites as per Exhibit 25.4.1.1 and Pub. L. 108-451, Sections 207(a)(1)(C)-(E). 
The Community is also prohibited from imposing higher water quality standards than the State, Sec (a)(6). 
15
 Id. Sec 207(a)(5)(I). Notwithstanding this waiver, Title II, Sec 209(d) specifies specific subsidence areas 
that will be remediated as per Exhibit 30.21, up to $4M appropriated for this program (Sec 214(a)(3).
16 See, 55 Fed. Reg. 9223 (1990), Criteria No. 5a.
17
 See Exhibit 7.2, para 3 for the names of all the parties to the GRIC settlement.
18
 Pub. L. 108-451, Title I, Sec 111 includes provisions in the event of non-implementation to return all 
appropriated funds to the Federal Treasury and to void contracts and Title II, Sec 215 provides for the 
return of Federal and SRP funds. In contrast the SAWRSA Amendments (Title III) includes a provision 
whereby the Secretary must compensate the tribe $18.3M if the new San Xavier farm is not completed to 
take the scheduled 27KAFY, Id at Title III, Sec 304 (c)(3)(a)(ii). There are also penalties for the non-
delivery of CAP water even in times of shortage, Id. at Sec 304(c)(d)(ii), Sec 305(a)(2)(A)-(B) and Sec 
305(d)(1).
19
 CAP is a reclamation project authorized and constructed by the U.S. in accordance with Title II of the 
Colorado River Basin Project Act (43 U.S.C. §§ 1521 et seq.)
20
 These counties are: Maricopa (Phoenix cities), Pinal (Phoenix cities and Casa Grande), and Pima 
(Tucson).
21
 The Colorado River Compact, 1922 (Congressional Record, 70th Cong. 2d Sess. At 324-325 ) allocated 
2.8 million acre feet (MAFY) to Arizona, of which 1.415 MAFY is delivered by the CAP, the remainder is 
used directly from the main stem of the Colorado River.
22
 Pub. L. 108-451, Article I, Sec.104, 2(c), 1(A).
5MAF by 24% to a total 7.24 MAF (see Table 1). The CAP delivers an additional water supply
that can be utilized to provide water for Indian water rights settlement, or, to support growth, or 
afford a buffer against future drought, or in the case of the AWSA support all three. Clearly the 
latter two outcomes could be achieved by other means. For example, voluntary water transfers
could facilitate the transfer of agricultural water to municipal use, and the private sector or State 
agencies could increase water recharge efforts, respectively. However, the momentum to settle 
the GRIC claims brought all the major water players in the state together and enabled the 
concurrent discussion of other water management issues. The simultaneity facilitated a relatively
comprehensive resolution of water issues within central Arizona (and with New Mexico).
Table 1: Arizona annual water demand by water source
Source MAF % of total
Colorado River 2.8 38.7
on-river (1.385) (19.1)
  off-river (1.415) (19.5)
In-state Rivers 1.4 19.3
  Salt (1.0) (13.8)
  Gila and others (0.4) (5.5)
Groundwater 2.9 40.1
Reclaimed water 0.14 1.9
TOTAL 7.24
Source: Arizona Department of Water Resources
The agreement, specifically Title I, settles outstanding CAP repayment and allocation issues. 
However, without the numerous side agreements that accompany the legislation, Titles II and III 
are not stand alone pieces of legislation. It is in the exhibits that the volume and sources of water 
for the GRIC settlement are specified and that the terms of water exchanges, water leases, and 
groundwater protection zones are specified. The side agreements are central to the agreement as a 
whole and facilitated the passage of State legislation.23 Many of the side agreements reflect 
mutually-beneficial relationships between tribal and non-tribal interests, not only in settling long-
standing disputes but also in working towards improved allocation of water quality to use, such as 
effluent-CAP exchanges.24 The side agreements with the State demonstrate how the settlement 
process enabled problematic issues of water management to be resolved, such as the development 
of groundwater protection zones and upstream consumptive use forbearance.
2.1 Title I: Central Arizona Project Settlement
Senator John Kyl (R) was a major proponent of the settlement, particularly this Title of the 
agreement. The contentious issue of CAP repayment was particularly troubling as it pitted 
Arizona against the Federal government. The agreement resolved this conflict. The CAP 
settlement also reallocates CAP water between federal and non-federal uses, from irrigation 
districts to Indian water settlements and cites, simultaneously resolving agricultural debt 
problems and advancing the stated goal of the CAP board to fully utilize Arizona’s Colorado 
River allocation. 
2.1a. CAP reallocation: Federal: non-Federal
A key provision is the division of CAP water between Federal and non-Federal uses. Of the total 
1.415 MAFY stipulated for delivery under long-term contracts by the CAP, 650,724 AFY is 
23
 For example, firming legislation had to be enacted by the State for the agreement to come into force as 
per Id. Title II, Sec 207(c)(1)(I)(ii). This legislation has passed, see H.B. 2835.
24
 Exhibit 18.1 to the AWSA, 2004.
6contracted to Arizona tribes, or to the Secretary of the Interior for allocation to Arizona tribes,
and the remainder, 764,276 AFY is set aside for non-Indian municipal and industrial (M&I)
entities, the Arizona Department of Water Resources (ADWR), and non-Indian agricultural 
(NIA) water.25 An outcome of this change is that NIA priority water has been converted into fixed 
volumes and 295,263 AFY in NIA contracts have been voluntarily relinquished . These provisions 
resulted in excess water available for Indian water rights settlements. 
2.1.b. CAP repayment
The allocation between Federal and non-federal uses substantially affects the repayment schedule 
for the conveyance infrastructure, the CAP. The resolution is also critical for the CAP Board to 
know with certainty its overall obligation to repay the “project's reimbursable construction costs 
as provided in its repayment contract with the United States”.26 The State is not responsible for 
the Federal uses portion (46%) of the project. In return for this division, the state or state parties 
benefit from $73.56M agricultural debt relief27 and $2B CAP debt repayment relief and Indian 
water cost-reduction benefits.28 On the other hand a significant share of CAP water is dedicated to 
Indian settlements and not for the other purposes it might have served.
The settlement went further than just resolving debt-related issues; it also identified a funding 
source to pay for the settlement through amendments to the Colorado River Basin Project Act of 
1968.29 These amendments allow funds credited to the Lower Colorado River Basin Development 
Fund (LCRBDF), a portion of revenues derived from the sale of energy for use in the State, and 
any annual payment made by the Central Arizona Water Conservation District (CAWCD) for 
reimbursable CAP construction costs, be credited each year against the annual payment owed by 
CAWCD to the Federal government for the CAP, without the need for further appropriations for 
specified purposes. Currently around $55M annually is deposited into the fund,30 but from 2010 
these accumulated funds will be used to pay down the cost of Indian water31 and to fund a suite of 
other projects identified in the settlements.32 The Fund in essence made this large and expensive 
settlement possible. The major advantage of this mechanism is that it precludes the need to go to 
the Congress, at a time of budget deficits and competing policy agendas, for appropriations to 
25
 Pub. L. 108-451, Title I, Sec. 104, (a)(2)(c)(1)(A)(i)
26
 CAP’s Mission Statement, http://www.cap-az.com/public/cap_award/index.cfm?action=award2. 
Accessed May 11, 2006.
27
 This is the debt incurred by non-Indian agriculture (minus a $85M contribution from CAWCD) and 
waived in return for the relinquishment of long-term CAP entitlements to NIA water. Sec 106(b)(1). Note 
that this debt relief will also reduce receipts for CAP capital costs, estimated at $2M annually, supra note 
25, p3.
28
 Net 93.5 KAFY (see footnote 92) CAP GRIC water MI&E subsidized costs of approximately $49/AF, 
28.2 KAFY CAP water for Tohono O’odham delivered free (2006 CAP M&I rate $82/AF), and 67.3 
KAFY for other tribes, probably under the same terms as the GRIC water, is equivalent to 93.5Kx$49 + 
28.2Kx$82 + 67.3Kx$49 = $10.19M annually.
29
 43 U.S.C. 1543
30
 Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate H.R. 885 AWSA, October 5, 2004, p4.
31
 The U.S. is responsible for delivering up to 311.8 KAFY of Community CAP water, Exhibit 8.2, para 5. 
This is the sum of its initial allocation, new NIA CAP allocation, and relinquished HVID and RWCD CAP 
allocations (subparas 5.4.1.1-5.4.1.4). This water will be delivered to the Community without CAP OM&R 
charges. GRIC is not required to repay any of the construction costs of the CAP, Pub. L. 108-451, Title II, 
Sec 205(a)(7)(B). In addition the Community is also released from paying CAP water service capital 
charges, Id. at Sec 205(a)(8). In 2006 these charges were $24/AF for M&I long-term subcontracts and 
$2/AF for agricultural long-term subcontracts. 
32
 Other uses of this Fund are detailed in Id. at Title I, Sec 107(a) amendments to Id. at 403(f)(2)(A)-(F). 
Note that  revenue funds in excess of those credited against the CAWCD payments will be directed to the
Federal government as per Id. at Sec 107 amendments to 403(f)(3)(A)-(G).
7fund Indian water rights settlements. On the State side, the funding mechanism limits the 
financial contribution from the State for the settlement of claims. 
There are a large number of beneficiaries from this Fund and although some funding priorities are 
detailed, others are not.33 This could set up future competition for funds; however, the Gila 
Settlement Agreement Parties have agreed to work together with the Secretary to ensure the 
funding of all projects in a timely manner. The establishment of the fund and these revenue 
streams was key in the acceptability of the settlement for Arizona water users: it was also key in 
the Office of Management and Budget’s (OMB) opposition to the settlement as it deprives the 
U.S. Treasury of CAP repayment funds: funds that now are redirected to the settlement parties. 
2.1.c. CAP reallocation: non-Indian Agricultural Priority Water
Resolving these issues engaged water users and water managers and identified a category of 
excess CAP NIA water as water that was available for Indian water rights settlements. The 
Secretary reallocated 195 KAFY of NIA water for this purpose,34 of which 102 KAFY is reserved 
for the GRIC,35 28.2 KAFY as part of the SAWRSA Amendments36 and 67.3 KAFY to other 
tribes.37 Of this latter allocation, 6,411 AFY is set aside for a future settlement with the Navajo 
Nation.38 This reallocation of NIA water is subject to future reallocation by the Secretary, if any 
of this set aside water remains unused, before a deadline date of December 31, 2030.39
Significantly, the federal government has provisions for a $250M Future Indian Water Settlement 
Subaccount to the LCBDF to aid in future Indian water rights settlements on the Gila, the Little 
Colorado and Colorado river systems.40 There are other arguments to settle without delay, such as 
rapid growth in the State with consequent increased water competition and dwindling excess 
water supplies. 
The GRIC also has access to another block of the total 295 KAFY NIA relinquished water. The 
Secretary in addition to the 195 KAF discussed above also held a total 37,918 AF of CAP 
relinquished RWCD and NVID water. Of this total, 36.7 KAF has been reallocated to GRIC and 
the remaining 1,218 AF will be held in trust for future Indian water rights settlements in either the 
Gila or Verde watershed. 
Another block of reallocated water is 96,295 AFY reallocated to the ADWR.41 This water will be 
held in reserve for future allocation. The motivation behind this staged allocation is to give 
growing communities that do not yet have the financial means to buy CAP contracts, the chance 
to participate in future CAP allocations. Without such a provision it is likely that large cities 
would contract for this water. There is demand for this currently unallocated water as cities and 
towns plan for future development. A looming concern for the cities is that once all unallocated 
CAP water is allocated or leased, they will have to secure new water supplies from other sources, 
water that could be more expensive than CAP water. 
33
 Id. at 403(f)(2) and (2)(D), for prioritized and non-prioritized funding, respectively.
34
 Id. at Sec 103, (a)(A).
35
 Id. at Sec 103, (a)(A)(i).
36
 Id. at Sec 103, (a)(A)(ii). Of which, 23KAF will be delivered to the San Xavier Reservation and 5.2KAF 
to the eastern Schuk Toak District.
37
 Id. at Sec 103, (a)(A)(iii).
38
 Id. at Sec 103, (a)(B)(ii). This is not a limit on a potential allocation to the Nation but rather an initial 
identified water source in part fulfillment of a negotiated water budget. 
39
 Id. at Sec 103, (a)(B)(i).
40
 Id. at Sec 107(a) amendments to 43 U.S.C. 1543 Sec 403(f)(2)(D)(vi).
41
 Id. at Sec 104, (a)(2)(A).
82.1.d. CAP reallocation: AWS
Settling Indian water rights claims requires buy-in from existing non-Indian water rights holders. 
For an Indian water settlement to be federally supported a necessary condition is that the 
settlement does not cause harm to non-Indian water rights holders and that uncertain tribal claims 
are resolved. The sufficient condition for this bill’s passage is that the settlement offers non-
Indian water users tangible benefits in addition to the removal of uncertainty over tribal claims, 
such as increased access to Assured Water Supply (AWS) supplies,42 and opportunities to lease or 
exchange water with the Community.
The agreement reallocates 65,647 AFY of uncontracted CAP M&I priority water that was not 
allocated in the first round of CAP allocations to twenty cities in the three-county CAP area.43
Not only is this water secure against all but the worst droughts, in terms of its ‘seniority’ in the 
CAP system, it is also available to the cities at CAP M&I rates, which in 2006 are $82/af 
delivered.44 In contrast, if these same cities were to purchase M&I water through market
transaction the cost is likely to be many times this amount. The quid pro quo for reallocating this 
M&I water to the cities, rather than using it for federal purposes, namely the settlement of Indian 
water rights claims, was that an equivalent volume45 of lower priority CAP water would be 
allocated to Arizona tribes, but that this water would be ‘firmed’ to M&I priority. Firming is 
discussed under supply reliability below.
2.2. Title II: Gila River Indian Community Water Rights Settlement
Title II concerns the GRIC water rights settlement. Settlements in the western U.S. facilitate 
access to ‘wet’ water through the identification of water sources and funds to develop the water 
for use on reservation. This settlement identifies water sources, pledges low cost water,46
allocates rehabilitation funds to ensure water deliver are made,47 and earmarks a $200M trust fund 
for water development. 
Before AWSA GRIC had the largest single contract for CAP water: 173,100 AFY.48 This is a 
non-trivial volume of water; however, given unlined conveyance canals and CAP prices, it was 
not profitable for the Community to use this water instead of groundwater. The agreement is 
significant because it not only settles outstanding water rights claims but also provides funds49 to 
42
 Assured Water Supply terms are described in A.R.S. §45-576, et seq. New rules became effective in 
1995.
43
 Pub. L. 108-451, Title I, Sec. 104(a)(2)(b)(1). To put this volume in context, 65,647 AFY of water could 
supply 65,647 five-person households for a year, ADWR 2006. This context is not theoretical, because the
grade of water, M&I, meets AWS standards. Therefore the twenty cities that received a portion of this 
reallocated supply can use this water for AWS purposes, that is, to support additional growth.
44
 CAP, Final 2006 Water Rate Schedule.
45
 The firming obligations of the Secretary and Arizona add up to 60,648 AF not 65,648 AF because during 
negotiations of the settlement Asarco agreed to offer 5KAFY to the GRIC settlement reducing the total 
volume of water to be firmed by 5 KAFY. Of the total the Secretary is obliged to firm 28.2 KAF for the 
SAWRSA agreement, ADWR 15 KAF for the GRIC agreement and the remaining 17,477 AF 
responsibility is divided equally between the parties. This water is for future Indian settlements. The State’s 
total firming responsibility is 23,724AF.
46
 The agreement provides for $53M to be deposited in the GRIC Water OM&R Trust Fund (Sec 107(a) 
which amends Section 403(f)(2)(B) of the Colorado River Basin Project Act (43 U.S.C. 1543(f)).
47
 Id. (f)(2)(C) provides for $147M (adjusted) to rehabilitate the San Carlos Irrigation Project.
48
 Water Delivery Contract No. 3-07-30-W0284, dated October 22, 1992.
49
 Exhibit 8.1 concerns the construction and payment of Project Works to deliver the initial 173.1KAFY 
CAP allocation (para2.16). The U.S. agrees to make available to the Community appropriated CAP funds 
not to exceed $388M (adjusted for construction cost inflation for the Project Works (para 5.1). The 
Community will be responsible for capital charges if any of this water is converted into CAP M&I water 
9develop all its water sources whilst simultaneously curbing groundwater pumping.50 It also buys 
down the operation costs for water delivered to the reservation.51 Water is not provided to the 
Community at zero delivery cost, unlike under the early Ak-Chin settlement.52 However, even 
though GRIC water is not costless to the tribe, an advantage in this settlement vis-à-vis the Ak-
Chin settlement, is that there is no need secure annual Congressional appropriations to buy down
the water cost because of the AWSA’s unique funding mechanism.53
2.2.a. GRIC water budget
Title II authorizes the Gila River Indian Community’s water budget as per the Master 
Agreement.54 To make up for the Gila River water that will not be delivered, the GRIC has 
received ‘substitute’ quantities of CAP water. This CAP water was available because agricultural 
interests, the state’s largest water users, were not fully utilizing CAP water because of lower cost 
access to groundwater. Agricultural districts defaulting on their CAP contracts is problematic, 
therefore the settlement rescues these unexercised agricultural contracts and ensures that the CAP 
investment is fully utilized. The settlement provides debt relief for contract relinquishment. Of 
the 350 KAFY relinquished 195 KAFY has been set aside for Community. The AWSA increases 
GRIC’s CAP water allocation from 173,100 AF to 328,800 AF or from 12% to 23% of total CAP 
water. (The resulting total allocation to Indian users exceeds 50% of the total CAP water). 
GRIC’s share of CAP water is large and reflects the strength of the GRIC’s water rights claims, 
however, the impact of this reallocation on other water users is mitigated by leasing arrangements 
embodied in the settlement.
The GRIC water budget (see Table 2) demonstrates how a comprehensive agreement can resolve 
a number of outstanding legal disputes between the Community and other parties. Some smaller 
cities made relatively large contributions to the overall water budget, such as the City of 
Chandler. In addition to the water, GRIC also gains access to the existing water conveyance
system. Some side agreements do not add to the water budget of the Community, but use 
exchanges to protect GRIC water rights (for example the agreement between the Community and 
the Phelps Dodge Corporation, discussed later). The water budget also highlights the diversified 
portfolio of water rights held by the GRIC which is comparable to those held by other large water 
providers in the state, such as Salt River Project (SRP) and the city of Phoenix. This 
diversification will assist the Community in managing its water supplies in times of drought, as 
its supplies come from three surface water sources, the Gila, Colorado and Salt Rivers, as well as 
from more drought-proof reclaimed and groundwater supplies. The agreement elevates the GRIC 
to a large water manager55 (and user) in the State. The Community has the opportunity and 
(para 6.3.5). With certain exemptions, the Community will be responsible for OM&R costs of the 
completed Project Works (para 11.1.2).
50
 This is in contrast to the San Carlos Apaches who got a large slug of CAP water but were unable to use it 
so instead have made 100-year leases. That is this water is not responsible for any direct jobs on the San 
Carlos Apache reservation.
51 The Secretary’s first priority is to pay for fixed OM&R costs for water deliveries [Pub. L. 108-451, Title 
II, Sec 205(a)(6)]. These costs are approximately $40/AF. Significantly, these costs have been increasing at 
a higher than inflation rate as they are sensitive to healthcare and wage costs. The Community must pay the 
residual costs which are the electricity costs or Pumping Energy Rate charges, which in 2006 were $33/AF.
52 Pub. L. 95-328 and amendments to this Act Pub. L. 102-497.
53 Previously, the CAWCD fixed the repayment schedule through the Fund, then forwarded it to the 
Congress, which then reallocated it back to the Community. Now, the money will go straight to the 
Community without the need for further appropriation. 
54
 Pub. L. 108-451, Sec 2: Definitions #34.
55
 Pub. L. 108-451, Title II, Sec 205 (c) allows the Community to lease water, Sec 205 (d) allows the 
Community to exchange reclaimed water and Sec 205 (f)(3) allows the Community to contract with the 
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mandate to refine its institutional and professional capacities for water management. There are 
numerous provisions in the settlement for the funding of, and the assumption of, responsibility for 
water measurement and monitoring activities on the reservation.
Table 2: GRIC Water Budget
Water Source AF
Community CAP Indian Priority        173,100 
Groundwater        156,200 
Globe Equity Decree        125,000 
New CAP non-Indian Agricultural (NIA) priority        102,000 
Salt River Project (SRP) Stored          20,500 
Roosevelt Water Conservation District (RWCD) CAP          18,600 
Harquahala Valley Irrigation District (HVID) CAP          18,100 
Asarco CAP          17,000 
Haggard Decree56            5,900 
Mesa reclaimed exchange premium            5,870 
RWCD surface water            4,500 
Chandler contributed reclaimed            4,500 
Chandler reclaimed exchange premium            2,230 
TOTAL 653,500
3. INNOVATIONS
An innovative feature of the AWSA is the degree to which it incorporates Indian water rights 
settlements into a comprehensive water bill. While all Congressionally authorized settlements 
consider water concerns in their region, AWSA does this on a greater geographic scale and across 
a broad variety of issues. The AWSA resolves multiple water allocation and payment issues
between the State and Federal government and, in the process, identifies excess water for Indian 
water rights settlements; making the agreement least disruptive to existing water users. The GRIC 
settlement itself, Title II, uses a watershed framework for resolving basin-wide disputes. 
Solutions negotiated on this scale are more likely to be durable because upstream water users and 
competing valley water users are integrated into the agreement. The Gila is already one of the 
most intensively managed and monitored watersheds in Arizona: the settlement will primarily 
reallocate water and funds in the watershed.
The settlement creatively taps existing financial resources from the Lower Colorado River Basin 
Development Fund, circumventing the need for what would otherwise be very large 
Congressional appropriations to buy-down the costs of significant quantities of water for the 
GRIC. While this creative funding was essential to AWSA, it will be difficult to use for future 
settlements as the OMB is opposed to altering U.S. Treasury fund inflows in this manner. The 
Arizona Water Banking Authority. The Community will also need to manage water rights with different 
priorities and the timing of deliveries. For example, the RWCD allocation has a delivery schedule of 
January 1 through September 30 (Exhibit 9.1, Sec 5.1.2) whereas other water is available each month of the 
year, such as CAP water contracts.
56
 In lieu of Haggard Decree water SRP shall deliver to the Reservation, at no cost to the Community of the 
U.S. the 5.9 KAFY from a pumping plant, the so-called Booster, on the Maricopa Drain. Exhibit 7.2 
Articles I and II. Article IV provides provisions for pumping in excess of this limit from this site, however, 
the electrical pumping charges would have to be borne by the Community or the U.S. This agreement is in 
return for waivers of liability for Salt River diversion that may have impacts water supplies for GRIC 
irrigation (Article X). 
11
agreement also contains water and money57 for future Indian water rights settlements in Arizona. 
This is an innovative tool to move future negotiations forward. Finally, there are numerous side 
agreements to the AWSA which enabled discrete issues between the Community and other
parties (for example, with Phelps-Dodge, SRP, and RWID). These side agreements in part helped 
to break the logjam in the wider negotiations. These agreements also established good faith 
negotiations with the Community and got others on board so that the negotiators could move 
forward to other issues. The next sections highlight some of the market tools, and water resource 
management and water supply reliability aspects of the AWSA.
3.1. Market-based tools: lease and exchange reallocation
Two types of market-based tools are discussed here: leases58 and exchanges.59 A crucial aspect of 
the settlement is that the GRIC is permitted to lease water.60 There are several restrictions: only 
non-Winters water can be marketed,61 CAP water can only be leased within Arizona,62 and water 
can only be leased for a maximum 100-years.63 Community CAP water must also be delivered 
through the CAP system64 and is subject to the CAP system’s priority-based shortage-sharing 
arrangements in times of drought.65 Furthermore, to protect lessees, there is a provision that leases 
and exchanges of Community CAP water will not affect any future allocation or reallocation of 
water by the Secretary.66 Leases fulfill a federal objective. Federal criteria require that the 
beneficiaries of Indian water rights settlements pay in proportion to their benefits. Lease
payments to the Community provide a key means for funding economic development on the 
reservation. 
At the time of the AWSA, the GRIC had entered into lease agreements with four Phoenix valley 
cities: Goodyear, Peoria, Phoenix, and Scottsdale.67 These agreements provide for the leasing of a
total 41 KAFY of GRIC CAP water to the cities for a period of not less than 100 years. This 
clause means that the water meets AWS requirements: water that can be used to support growth. 
Although the volumes leased differ, all the agreements have the same cost terms. There are 
various payment schedules; all involve an initial lump sum, money that can be used for 
immediate investments on the Reservation. Water is available for lease at a price determined by a 
pricing formula. This formula is based on water valuation completed for the Salt River Pima 
57
 $250K will be credited to the Future Indian Water Settlement Subaccount of the Lower Colorado Basin 
Development Fund to fund future settlements (Id at Title I, Sec 107(a) The agreement provides for $53M to 
be deposited in the GRIC Water OM&R Trust Fund (Sec 107(a) which amends Section 403(f)(2)(D)(vi) of 
the Colorado River Basin Project Act (43 U.S.C. 1543(f)).
58
 Pub. L. 108-451, Title II, Sec 205(c) gives the Secretary approval for the lease arrangements with Phelps-
Dodge and the seven Phoenix cities attached to the agreement as Exhibits.
59
 Id at Sec 205(d) provides the Secretary approval for the reclaimed water exchange agreements with the 
cities of Chandler and Mesa, which also appear as Exhibits to the agreement.
60
 Id at Sec 205(a)(2).
61
 Id at Sec 205(f)(2) states that Gila River agreement, Globe Equity Decree, and Haggard Decree water 
cannot be sold, leased, transferred, or used off-Reservation other than by exchange.
62
 Id at Sec 205(a)(2)(A). This limitation is repeated in Sec 205(a)(8)(f)(1). Exceptions are detailed in Title 
I, Sec 104(e)(2) for water leased or exchanged with the AWBA or for an exchange with New Mexico as per 
the NM Consumptive Use and Forbearance Act ratified under Title II, Sec 212.
63
 Id at Sec 205(a)(2)(B).
64
 Id at Sec 205(a)(4)(A).
65
 Id at Sec 205(a)(4)(B).
66
 Id. at Sec 213(d).
67
 Exhibits 17.1A-D. Goodyear and Peoria have contracts to lease up to 7 KAF of CAP water each, Phoenix 
up to 15 KAF and Scottsdale up to 12 KAF annually.  
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Maricopa Indian Community Water Rights Settlement Act in 1988,68 but it allows for consumer 
price inflation over the intervening years.69 There are several payment plans.70 If the entire lease 
is paid for upfront (in March 2006, for example), $1,743 secures 1 AFY of water over the period 
of the lease, 100 years. This water is available to the cities without payment of water service 
capital charges, though operation, maintenance and replacement (OM&R) charges must be paid. 
This water is also subject to shortage sharing. Any reductions will be in the same proportion as 
M&I priority CAP water. The cities are allowed to re-lease this water, but only within the CAP 
three county area.
These agreements seem to benefit both sides to the contract: the cities secure, inexpensive water 
that meets AWS standards, while the Community receives money upfront (a total $71.463M)71
for investment on the reservation. In addition, the U.S. Treasury benefits to the extent that lease 
holders must pay CAP OM&R costs, costs that would not be paid if the water remained with the 
Community.72 To illustrate, in 2006 OM&R costs for these leases would be around $2M. 
A clearer evaluation comes from comparing the lease agreements to a likely alternative. The four 
cities with lease agreements have accessed low price,73 secure water, at the cost of the lease price 
and CAP OM&R costs. However, it is possible that the cities could have made even better water 
deals, for example with agricultural interests along the Colorado River. The opportunity costs74 of 
the cities’ investment in 100-year leases are alternative spending priorities in the cities. However, 
their opportunity costs are  mitigated by their ability to re-lease the water to others and their
desire to hold a diversified portfolio of water. On the other hand the Community is bound by the 
lease pricing mechanism even if the value of water in the region rises substantially. This 
designated pricing formula has little connection with forces affecting future water demand,
supply and market value. 
The Community has a side agreement with Phelps-Dodge Corporation resolving all outstanding 
water rights litigation between the parties75 and incorporating provisions for lease and exchange.76
68
 Pub. L. 100-512. The water price in this agreement is the result of a cost analysis of replacement CAP 
water capitalized over the period of the lease.
69
 To account for inflation the base payment of $1,203 per AF is multiplied by a ratio. This ratio is of the 
CPI-U (this is the Consumer Price Index for All Items for All Urban Consumers, U.S. City Average, 
published by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics) in the month the term begins 
divided by this index value in December 1991. For example, for the City of Goodyear the formula for an 
agreement beginning in March 2006 is: ((199.8/137.9) x $1,203) x 7 KAF = $12,200,985.
70
 These plans range from the upfront payment of the entire lease costs within 30 days of the contract to an 
upfront payment of 1/15 of the total lease cost plus fourteen annual installments of 1/15 of the lease cost 
plus interest, where the interest is the Chase Manhattan Prime rate plus 1%.
71
 If the cities paid the leases upfront. See footnote 69.
72
 Pub. L. 108-451, Title II, Sec 205(a)(6) provides that the Secretary shall pay the OM&R costs for the 
delivery of Community CAP water to GRIC, given adequate funds in the Lower Colorado River Basin 
Development Fund, but not for water leased by others. In 2006 OM&R costs are $49/AF. 
73
 Id. at Sec 205(a)(8) states that CAP water service capital charges are not payable for Community CAP 
water whether or not the water is used on-Reservation. This is reiterated in Sec 205(e).
74 Opportunity cost is a term used in economics to mean the cost of an action or project in terms of the next 
most valuable opportunity forgone (and the net benefits that could have been received from that 
opportunity. (Wikipedia, accessed May 12, 2006).
75
 Phelps-Dodge’s water rights are listed as Attachments C-1 to C-3 and its water rights priorities asserted 
in Attachment D to Exhibit 10.1
76
 Exhibit 10.1.
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The initial lease is for 12 KAFY of CAP Indian Priority77 water for a 50 year term.78 The lease 
price will be paid in full at the start of the lease term in the amount of $4.8M.79 Within two years 
of the end of this initial lease the parties can start negotiating for a renewal for an additional 50 
years. At this stage a new lease price will be determined by negotiation of ‘fair market value’ 
which will be based on then-current M&I priority CAP water prices and other agreed to factors.80
If no price can be agreed upon within a year of the termination of the initial lease then the 
Secretary will establish a fair market value using comparable lease quantities and prices for M&I 
priority CAP water.81 This lease can either be paid in a single installment or in ten equal 
installments plus accrued interest of 8% per annum.82 As per the city leases above, Phelps-Dodge 
will not pay CAP capital charges, but will pay OM&R charges.83 The corporation can use the 
water for direct use, recharge or exchange with GRIC or other parties within the CAWCD Service 
Area.84 The agreement also includes terms for an option to lease an additional 10 KAFY of Indian 
priority CAP water within a 20-year option period.85 The price and payment terms of this 
agreement are similar to those of the renewal lease above.86
The Community also has an exchange agreement with Phelps-Dodge Corporation whereby the 
corporation can divert upstream Gila River water, in accordance with environmental laws, in lieu 
of CAP water. This exchange provision allows for a limited decoupling of beneficial use and 
location of the exchange-water right. This may have implications for water management in this 
watershed: issues that must be resolved by the Secretary.87 In addition to the lease agreement,
another source of Phelps-Dodge funds for the benefit of the Community is the so-called 
“monetary consideration for settlement”. This $18M compensation fund88 is in return for waivers 
and confirmation of the company’s water rights.89
Another side agreement90 authorizing exchanges with two Phoenix valley cities will give GRIC 
access to “exchange” and “contributed” reclaimed water supplies to up to 45.1 KAFY. These 
exchanges were made possible by new water ‘accounting’ rules that mean any entity which 
receives CAP water in exchange for reclaimed water does not have to count this CAP-exchange 
water against its contracted CAP allocation.91 GRIC will receive up to 29.4 KAFY of Mesa 
reclaimed water, up to 11.2 KAFY of Chandler “exchange reclaimed water”, and an additional 
4.5 KAFY of Chandler “contributed reclaimed water”. The Chandler and Mesa exchanges are 
based on a 4:5 ratio: the cities receive 1/5 less CAP water (a total 32.5 KAFY). This exchange 
77
 This type of CAP water has high priority in the system. Exhibit 8.2, Sec 5.7 details the priority system of 
the CAP and the impact of shortage on the system and the appropriate formula to calculate CAP Indian and 
CAP M&I allocations. 
78
 Id para 6.1.
79
 Id para 6.2. There are provisions to adjust this sum for inflation. The lease cost works out at $400/AF for 
50 years, this is a lower price that the lease water for cities, see footnote 69.
80
 Id. Para 6.3(a)
81
 Id. Para 6.3(b).
82
 Id. Paras 6.4 (a)-(b).
83
 Id. Para 6.5. The value of these OM&R charges is $588,000/year.
84
 Id. Para 6.8.
85
 Id. Paras 7.1-7.7. Phelps-Dodge will pay the Community $50K annually for right to have this option.
86
 Id. Paras 7.4-7.5.
87
 See footnote 114.
88
 Exhibit 10.1, Sec 4.1.
89
 Of this total, $1M has already been paid as per the terms of the agreement and a schedule and terms for 
the payment of the remaining $17M have also been agreed, including penalties for non-compliance.
90
 Exhibit 18.1 to the agreement.
91
 Pub. L. 108-451, Title I, Sec 104(d)(2)(E)(i).
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may seem like a poor trade, however, such exchanges can delay new investment in wastewater 
treatment facilities or upgrades. Cities often recharge treated wastewater (which is of poorer 
quality); it is consequently mixed with groundwater and recovered. This is an expensive process 
that also requires large tracts of land and available aquifer space. This process is bypassed in 
these agreements at the cost of a fifth of the water. The exchange water (CAP water) requires no 
pre-treatment for storage. The cities likely incur cost savings at their wastewater treatment 
facilities and the Community benefits from securing reclaimed water as a drought-proof 
agricultural and golf course irrigation92 water supply.
The sum of all of these lease and exchanges just discussed is that the GRIC will have a net 93.5
KAFY  additional allocation of mostly NIA grade water for agricultural development.93 We
estimate that leases, exchanges and options will reduce the Community’s combined CAP IA, 
CAP M&I, and CAP firmed NIA water (a total 205.1 KAFY) by 95.5 KAFY while increasing 
revenues by around $78M.94
3.2. Water resource management
This section details some of the water management tools incorporated into the settlement, such as 
conservation measures and water management plans.
A water settlement process creates the opportunity to settle not only Indian water rights claims 
but also to address other water management issues. This is particularly true when the settlements 
are basin-wide. In multiple agreements the signatory tribes are required to develop on-reservation 
water codes,95 groundwater codes,96 water management plans,97 and monitoring capabilities.98
The reason for these requirements is that the ADWR has no jurisdiction on Indian reservations. 
Thus tribal water management features have been incorporated as integral elements in the 
settlements. The tribes remain sovereign managers of their groundwater use but are required to 
contribute to overall water use efficiency in the state. 
One aspect of water management is efficiency, efficiency in use and in delivery. Conservation 
practices are incorporated into the settlement through the rehabilitation of irrigation district
infrastructure. The GRIC settlement makes the GRIC the manager of the SCID, makes provisions 
for its rehabilitation, and creates a rehabilitation fund.99 Investments in canal lining will conserve 
water, of which, GRIC will be entitled to up to 18 KAF.100 The Community agreed to develop an 
effective water conservation program prior to the delivery of its initial allocation of CAP NIA 
92
 The reservation has three golf courses.
93
 On the addition side: 102 KAF new NIA CAP + 18.6 KAF RWCD CAP + 17.8 KAF HVID CAP + 17 
KAF Asarco CAP + 40.6 KAF Chandler/Mesa reclaimed = 196 KAF. On the subtraction side: 41 KAF city 
leases + 17 KAF Asarco lease + 12 KAF Phelps-Dodge lease + 32.5 KAF Chandler/Mesa exchange = 
102.5 KAF. Net additions are 196 KAF-102.5 KAF = 93.5 KAF.
94
 See footnote 165.
95
 The GRIC must develop a Community Water Code within 18 months of the enactment of the AWSA,
2004. The requirements of this code are detailed in Pub. L. 108-451, Title II, Sec 204(e)(A).
96
 The Secretary will provide $215,000 to the San Xavier District and $175,000 for the eastern Schuk Toak 
District to develop and implement a groundwater management program, Id. at Title III, Sec 311(c)(1)-(2).
97
 The Secretary will provide $891,200 to the San Xavier District and $237,200 to the Tohono O’odham to 
develop such plans (Id. at Sec 308(d)(2)(A)(i) and (ii)).
98
 The Community has a $3.4M fund to develop a water monitoring program, GRIC WRSA, subpara 27.2.
99
 Pub. L. 108-451, Title II, Sec 203(d) and a $52.396M fund Title II,  Sec 214(a)(1)(A).
100
 Id. at Sec 203(d)(4)(B)(ii).
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water.101 A final example of conservation as a water efficiency tool is contained in the side 
agreements between GRIC and four towns along the Gila River.102 All the agreements have a 
clause requiring the town to control phreatophytes.103 The conservation measures adopted in the 
settlement are small steps towards greater water efficiency in the State.
3.3. Water supply reliability
There are a number of features in the AWSA that increase water supply reliability for the 
Community (and third parties). These include agreements with upstream water users, increased 
diversification of water supplies, and firming arrangements. Groundwater pumping protection 
zones are also important supply reliability mechanisms, because they reduce stressors to the 
reservation’s aquifers.
3.3.a. Upstream consumptive use forbearance
A key provision in the agreement to improve basin-wide water management is upstream 
forbearance. There are a number of provisions incorporating outright water right extinguishment 
and fallowing arrangements. The Secretary will provide funds to the Gila Valley Irrigation 
District and the Franklin Irrigation District (the so-called Upper Valley Defendants, UVD) for the 
acquisition of specified decreed water rights. The water rights appurtenant to 2,000 acres of 
land104 will either be extinguished to reduce diversions from the Gila River or will be transferred 
to the SCIP for the benefit of the GRIC and SCIDD.105 The agreement incorporates a timetable 
for the acquisition of these rights and a formula for compensation.106
An interesting feature of the AWSA is the number of clauses that consider future Indian water 
rights settlements. The motivation for including such clauses in this agreement is to encourage 
and provide resources for future settlements and also in recognition of the failed attempt to 
incorporate a comprehensive agreement with SCAT (Title IV) in the AWSA. For example,
provisions are made for the purchase and transfer of water rights appurtenant to between 500 and 
3,000 additional acres from the UVID if a water rights settlement with the San Carlos Apache 
Tribe is reached.107
Fallowing arrangements can be used with, or in lieu of, the water rights extinguishment and 
transfer arrangements above. Irrigation districts can enter into fallowing arrangements which 
essentially reduce irrigation acreage thereby reducing demands on the Gila River.108 Another 
101
 Exhibit 8.1, para 14. This program must contain objectives, economically feasible water conservation 
measures, and time schedules for meeting the objectives. At five year intervals progress must be reported 
and necessary revisions made to the program.
102
 Exhibits 26.1 and 26.3-26.5.
103
 For example, in Exhibit 26.1, Para 13. Phreatophytes are water-loving plants. The middle Gila River is 
one area in the State that has growing problem with salt cedar infestation of waterways: these exotic 
phreatophytes consume large volumes of water.
104
 Pub. L. 108-451, Title II, Sect 211(a)(2)(A)-(B). Water rights will be acquired in two 1,000 acre phases.
105
 Id. at Sec 211(a)(5)(a)(i). Of the decreed water rights associated with 2,000 acres above, the water rights 
associated with 900 acres will be transferred to the SCIP.
106
 Id at Sec 211(a)(2)(A)-(D). The value of a water right appurtenant to 1,000 acres of land will be 
determined and the Secretary will pay districts 125% of this value, Id. at Sec 211(a)(2)(D)(3). Such 
monetary compensation is one method for keeping non-Indian water rights holders ‘whole’. In addition the 
UV irrigation districts will receive a $15M fund to comply with the NM CUFA, Id. at Sec 213(g)(1).
107
 Id. at Sec 211(a)(2)(C). The division of benefits from such a transfer and elucidated in Sec 
211(a)(5)(B)(i)-(iii) whereby GRIC will receive the water rights to 200 acres, the water rights appurtenant 
to 300 acres will be extinguished and the balance will be transferred to SCAT.
108
 Id. at Sec 211(a)(4)(B).
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provision incorporates environmental goals. A cooperative program would allow for the purchase 
and extinguishment of water rights appurtenant to agricultural lands that have not recently been 
irrigated in the upper valley for the benefit or riparian habitat. Essentially this provision would 
prevent riparian parcels from being reclaimed for agriculture. The irrigation districts have also 
agreed to limits on river diversions and groundwater pumping for the benefit of the river and 
GRIC’s water rights.109
There is also a consumptive use and forbearance agreement with the upstream State of New 
Mexico as part of the “New Mexico Unit” (NMU).110 New Mexico has an authorized 
apportionment of Gila River basin water as provided by article IV of the decree of Arizona v. 
California (376 U.S. 340). At the time of the decree an apportionment for future uses was not 
specified. This NMU refers to supplemental consumptive use water that will be made available to 
water users of an amount not to exceed a 18 KAFY, of which 4 KAFY can be diverted from the 
San Francisco River and the rest from the Gila River.111 This use is conditional on there being 
adequate Colorado River (exchange) water for delivery to downstream Gila River users in 
Arizona and adequate reservoir storage.112 Funds to construct this project are detailed in Title II, 
Sections 212 (i) and (j) and Section 213(g)(1). The NMU must pay its share of the OM&R CAP 
costs but is exempt from capital costs. A fund has been created to pay for the construction of the 
Unit.113 Crucially, the Secretary is instructed not to approve any new Gila River water for CAP 
water exchanges that would conflict with this more senior exchange.114 In this basin the Secretary 
will have the responsibility to ensure that all the decree, exchange, and other water rights are kept 
“whole”, 115 and that each new exchange proposal is strictly reviewed.
There are significant provisions for managing water resources in other areas of the Gila River and 
its tributaries. These sections of the settlement combine a number of water management tools, for 
instance municipal water budgets, groundwater pumping forbearance zones, and restrictions on 
new dam building. A comprehensive assessment of current and future water needs and of various 
water resource management strategies has underpinned the design these measures. GRIC has
forbearance agreements with municipalities in the middle Gila valley116 and with agricultural, 
industrial, M&I, and domestic water users in the San Pedro River and Aravaipa Creek 
watersheds117 and those inside the Gila River Impact Zone118 who are parties to the Globe Equity
109
 Id. at Sec 211(b)(1)-(3).
110
 This side agreement is an exhibit to the main law. It is not numbered but goes by the short title 
“Consumptive Use and Forbearance Agreement” (CUFA). The main provisions are under Id. at Sec 212. 
Phelps-Dodge Corp is also a signatory to this agreement.
111
 CUFA paras 4.4 and 4.3 (Pub. L 212(d)(1). The cost of installing water gauges on the rivers will be 
borne by the U.S. up to $0.5M (Pub. L. 108-451, Title I, Sec 107(a) The agreement provides for $53M to 
be deposited in the GRIC Water OM&R Trust Fund (Sec 107(a) which amends Section 403 (f)(2)(D)(vii) 
of the Colorado River Basin Project Act (43 U.S.C. 1543(f))..
112
 CUFA paras 4.5 and 4.7. Water banking provisions are allowed (paras 4.6, 5.4-6.6) and the terms of the 
water diversions, including dates and volumes are specified Exhibit 2.47 Sec (B) (1.1)-(1.1.2.3.).
113
 These provide for a $66M (adjusted) NMU Fund for the construction of the NMU. The Secretary may 
provide additional construction funds from $34M to a maximum $62M (Pub. L. 108-451, Title I, Sec 
107(a) which amends Section 403(f)(2)(D)(i) and (ii) of the Colorado River Basin Project Act (43 U.S.C. 
1543(f)).
114
 Pub. L. 108-451, Title II, Sec 212 (m). New Mexico has senior exchange priority as per the 1968 Act.
115
 In an over-allocated watershed where no ‘new’ water supplies are available for settlement, non-Indian 
water users might be financially compensated or made whole, for relinquished water rights.
116 Agreements with Safford, Duncan, Kearney, and Mammoth are attached as exhibits (Exhibits 26.1, 26.3, 
26.4 and 26.5, respectively).
117
 Two Impact Zones (IZ) are specified on maps they are: the San Pedro River and Aravaipa Creek IZs, as 
shown in Exhibit 2.146B. These zones extend to the incorporate the fluvial depositional systems of these 
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Decree. These agreements require the establishment of the Gila River Watershed Maintenance 
Program119 in State law to limit groundwater pumping in these areas. Another section of the 
proposed program is the establishment of “Safe Harbor” provisions120 to protect existing non-
irrigation water users water rights in these watersheds from legal challenge. The Safe Harbor 
provisions permit new domestic and large industrial uses in these impact zones under specific 
terms and as long as the new use does not exceed the adjudicated water entitlement. These 
provisions allow for growth but place limits on groundwater pumping for the benefit of the rivers 
and the downstream Community.
The state has passed new legislation establishing a Gila River Maintenance Area (GRMA) and a 
GRMA Impact Zone.121 There are prohibitions on the construction of new or enlarged dams 
within the GRMA, with some exceptions for example for flood control, and provisions to prohibit 
the irrigation of new lands within the GRMAIZ.122 These provisions will be enforced by the 
ADWR. This legislation will not only benefit the downstream GRIC Reservation by limiting 
groundwater pumping in the alluvial zones of the main rivers and tributaries and limiting new
storage on the river, but also benefit the SRP, the other large downstream water right holder.
To illustrate the complexity of the municipal forbearance arrangements, the side agreement with 
the City of Safford (Exhibit 26.1) is examined. The city has an initial water budget of 9.74 KAFY
for M&I uses: this budget allocates water for growth as projected water use on the enforceability 
date is just 7.5KAFY.123 Any consumptive water use above this budget must be matched with an
identified water source. Furthermore, any exceedances must be mitigated according to set rules.124
The impact of potential new groundwater pumping (in and outside the protection zones) has to be 
modeled. If and only if, it is found to have no impact on the upper Gila River, is it exempted from 
counting as a new diversion against water budget, but if not, it will count against the city’s water 
budget.125 In return for compliance with these terms, the city will receive debt relief of up to 
$13.9M.126 The agreement incorporates provisions for accounting, reporting, and dispute 
resolution; hallmarks of a durable agreement.127 There are similar restrictions and provisions in
the other metropolitan side agreements.128 These side agreements demonstrate the benefits of a 
negotiated settlement in achieving improved water management in effected watersheds. 
3.3.b. Reservation groundwater protection zones
rivers. Areas included in this forbearance are San Manuel, Winkelman, Cochise County, and BHP company 
(subparas 26.8.2.7.1-26.8.2.8.).
118
 Exhibit 2.84A.
119
 State legislation creating this GRWMP must be enacted by the enforceability date to secure all these 
side agreements (Title II, Sec 207(c)(1)(I)(iii). 
120
 These provisions are detailed in the GRIC WRSA, para 26.8.2
121
 As per HB 2728 which added A.R.S. §45-2603.
122
 Id. §45-2631 and §45-2641. Lands irrigated between January 1, 2000 and the effective date of this 
Section are exempt. This new prohibition may be redundant if new irrigated agriculture in this region is not 
profitable.
123
 Exhibit 26.1, budget as per subpara 2.15 and current use as per subpara 4.2.
124
 Id. Para 10.
125
 Id. Subpara 9.3 and subpara 9.2.
126
 Pub. L. 108-451, Title II, Sec 214(a)(5)(A).
127
 Exhibit 26.1, paras 12, 14, and 17.
128
 Initial water budgets for the other towns are: Kearny 600 AF, Mammoth 300 AF, both within the Gila 
River, Middle Gila River and San Pedro River impact zones, and the Town of Duncan 470AF, of which 
400AF within the UV impact zone. 
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The settlement requires new state legislation to protect on-Reservation groundwater for the 
GRIC.129 Titles II (and III) contain provisions that create a buffer zone around reservations, 
within which groundwater pumping by non-Indians is limited. This is a regulatory innovation: a 
specific settlement provision analogous to State groundwater law is being used to protect 
groundwater levels beneath the reservations of sovereign tribes. A precursor to these protection 
zones are limits to on-reservation groundwater pumping. The GRIC are allowed to pump 156.2 
KAFY. For the tribes to accept such limits on their groundwater use there had to be concurrent 
groundwater pumping restrictions on non-Indians near reservation boundaries. Significantly, the 
GRIC’s groundwater protection zone and replenishment requirements are stricter than State well 
spacing rules and the Central Arizona Groundwater Replenishment District (CAGRD),130 in terms 
of the actual measurement of the cone of depression and the spatial connectivity of replenishment 
and pumping. 
The Southside Replenishment Program establishes five protection zones131 along the southern 
border of the GRIC Reservation in which water conveyance outside the Eastern or Western 
Protection Zones is prohibited for non-irrigation use, with certain exemptions,132 and where the 
State has obligations to replenish groundwater pumped in excess of set limits. For example, in the 
Eastern Protection Zone replenishment obligations are triggered when pumping is in excess of 
2.33AF/acre.133 The replenishment obligations are spatially connected to the groundwater 
pumping so that the spatial integrity of the aquifer is respected and incidentally subsidence risk is 
reduced. This spatial aspect of the replenishment was a sticking point with the Community which 
was concerned about existing impacts on their groundwater by non-Indian users. To resolve this 
issue the state agreed to an additional replenishment volume to recompense for historic pumping. 
The State is required to establish a Southside Replenishment Bank and deliver at least 1 KAFY 
up to a total 15 KAF and to ensure that credits never fall below 5 KAF.134 This block of water 
will be delivered at no charge to the Community and will be paid for by withdrawal fees from 
Pinal County. The AWBA, the firming agent for the State, has plans to fulfill this obligation in 
one direct delivery of CAP water during 2006 because excess water is available now. 
3.3.c. Access to stored water
A key benefit of the GRIC settlement is new access to reservoirs and thus stored water. It is with 
stored water that one of the SRP roles in the settlement becomes clear. SRP was one of the 
drivers of the settlement and is one of the main beneficiaries.135 The 1.8 MAFY GRIC claim 
could have severely impacted SRP’s ability to reliably supply water. The agreements between 
GRIC and SRP are detailed in the GRIC Water Rights Settlement Agreement. SRP offered a 
combination of access to water and access to water delivery infrastructure to settle outstanding 
disputes with the Community. GRIC is entitled to an initial 2 KAFY rising to 35 KAFY of stored 
129
 Title II, Sec 207(c)(1)(i). This is the so-called Southside Replenishment Program.
130
“The purpose of the CAGRD is to provide a mechanism for landowners and water providers to 
demonstrate an assured water supply under the new AWS Rules”. “The CAGRD must replenish (or 
recharge) in each AMA the amount of groundwater pumped by or delivered to its members which exceeds 
the pumping limitations imposed by the AWS Rules.” There is no requirement to replenish the same 
localized area where groundwater was pumped. 
http://www.cagrd.com/Gen_Info/index.cfm?action=execSum. Accessed May 11, 2006.
131
 A.R.S. §45-2602 (A) as amended by HB 2728.
132
 Id. §45-2611(A-B).
133
 Id. §45-26022(3)(d).
134
 Id. §45-2624(A)-(C).
135 SRP delivers 1 MAFY to a central Arizona service area and also provides electricity to nearly 860,000 
retail customers in the Phoenix area. http://www.srpnet.com/about/facts.aspx accessed May 5, 2006.
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SRP water in any year that net storage levels are above 100 KAF on May 1st.136 Furthermore, the 
Community can accrue credits up to 45 KAF: this facility is another hedge against supply 
variability.137 This stored water will be delivered through SRP drainage ditches that GRIC is 
permitted to use,138 and the water will be managed and monitored by the Community.139 The price 
of stored water is determined annually and in 2005 was $11.25/AF.140 Up to 836 AFY of 
additional stored water from the Blue Ridge Dam may be made available to the Community.141
The parties have an option for a SRP stored water-CAP water exchange.142 As with the other 
stored water, the Community can receive water credits.143 This agreement entitles the Community 
to yet another source of water and access to storage at a low cost.144
3.3.d. Diversification of water sources
A key benefit of the GRIC settlement is the diversification of the tribe’s water supplies and new 
access to reservoirs, discussed above (see Figure 1). Prior to the agreement, the tribe was reliant 
on a drought-prone and over-allocated Gila River watershed. Prior to the settlement the
Community received just over a third of its Globe Equity allocation. The settlement shifts the 
Community’s water allocation from the Gila River to the Colorado River, via the CAP. In 
essence, 185 KAF of Gila water has been replaced by CAP water. There are advantages to this 
substitution. The Colorado River has more storage, and is highly managed with drought reliability 
a foremost objective. One drawback from this substitution is that CAP water is more expensive to 
provide for the Community than Gila River water. 
136
 GRIC WRSA, Sec 12.1. Volumes available will ratchet up over a five year period to the maximum 
entitled as per para 12.2.
137
 Id. at subpara. 12.3.1.
138
 SRP will also pay GRIC $0.5M towards cost of easements, construction, rehabilitation, operation and 
maintenance of these drain ditches on the reservation, Id at subpara 16.9.
139
 Id. at subparas 12.5.1 and 12.5.4.
140
 Id. at para 12.7. Prices are determined by the Board of Governors of the Salt River Valley Water Users’ 
Association. 
141
 Id. at subpara 12.13.1. Unlike the SRP stored water this will not be subject to transportation or 
evaporation losses, or spills (Id. at subpara 12.13.3.). The cost of this water is 10% of the OM&R costs 
(Pub. L. 108-451, Title II, Sec 12.12.4 and Exhibit 12.13.4). In addition up to 3.5 KAFY will be made 
available for M&I purposes in Northern Gila County (Id. at Sec 213 (i)(3)(B).
142GRIC WRSA, para 13.1. The Community will pay for all associated pumping charges (Id. at subpara 
13.1.1)
143
 Id. at para 13.2.
144
 Id. at subpara 13.5.5. Water costs in 2005 were $10.06/AF plus transportation charges of $12.14/AF. A 
flat administrative fee of approximately $4,254 in each year the option is exercised would also be levied.
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Figure 1: GRIC Water Budget Water Sources
GRIC’s water portfolio is dissimilar to that of the State as a whole (see Table 1). GRIC is more 
heavily reliant on surface water (Colorado River and in-state rivers) than the State. The 
Community has a lower reliance on groundwater than Arizona as a whole. Groundwater supplies,
if well managed, can be a buffer against long-term drought and improve long term sustainability 
of reservation activities that depend on water. The settlement introduced groundwater 
management rules akin to those in Active Management Areas (AMAs), to the reservation. 
Additionally, the Community benefits from stricter-than-State’s rules governing the pumping and 
sinking of new wells within the newly created groundwater protection zone. The Community now 
has access to above-ground stored water through agreements with SRP. The settlement also 
opened a new source of water to the Community; highly reliable reclaimed water. The 
Community itself has a small population and therefore limited opportunities to generate reclaimed 
water supplies. However, through side agreements with the nearby cities of Chandler and Mesa it 
takes Grade A+ reclaimed water in exchange for CAP water on a 5:4 ratio. This reliable water 
source has another benefit, in that it can replace higher quality groundwater for agricultural and 
golf course irrigation. Overall the settlement has diversified the Community’s water supplies and 
increased protection from current and future water users upstream, bordering the reservation, and 
on the reservation.
An important aspect of water diversification is water supply reliability. The priority of the
Community’s CAP water allocations is fundamental to any assessment of the reliability of the 
Community’s (agricultural water) supplies. The Community currently plans to develop up to 
120,000 acres of irrigable land on the reservation. The PIA standard has focused near-term 
economic development on the reservation on agriculture. For a period of 100 years, just 15 
KAFY or 14.7% of the Community’s new 102 KAFY NIA CAP allocation will have at least the 
same priority as M&I water via State firming commitments. Delivery of the residual 87 KAFY is 
at risk in a future drought because it has the lowest priority in the CAP system: in a severe 
drought these contracts would be cut first. If one uses the State’s forecast of drought probability, 
which they use in determining firming volumes, the Colorado River is expected to be in drought 
one quarter of the time, that is one year in four the Community might receive none of this 
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allocation.145 One hundred years after the settlement, the Community will be reliant on low 
priority rights for a fifth of its total water budget. 
Other water sources included in GRIC budget are also subject to shortage risk. For example, the 
RCWD 4.5 KAFY relinquishment water, surface water from the Salt and Verde Rivers, has lower 
priority than RCWD water allocated to the Salt River Pima Maricopa Indian Community and the 
Fort McDowell Indian Community settlement agreements.146 Mitigating this risk are firmer 
alternative Community agricultural water supplies, namely 173.1 KAFY of IA water and 45.1 
KAFY of reclaimed water. These water sources are more drought-proof for planning agricultural 
investments, but also are appealing to potential lessees. The Community could minimize its
exposure to NIA junior status by managing groundwater as a backup drought supply. This 
however would require the Community to establish a groundwater recovery and delivery system
capable of delivering groundwater to reservation locations normally reliant on surface water. An 
alternative strategy for reducing drought-induced risks to agricultural investments is to limit the 
amount of irrigable land developed (developing least profitable lands last).
However, it is important to compare this situation with the situation prior to the settlement for the 
Community. The GRIC likely has much more reliable supplies with this arrangement than its 
previous reliance on Gila River and groundwater supplies.147 Nevertheless, GRIC needs to plan 
for drought to ensure that cutbacks in the activities relying on its 102 KAFY NIA CAP allocation
can readily be accommodated. Possible uses for this water include annual crops (that could be 
fallowed in dry years), or leasing to the Arizona Water Banking Authority or other entities that 
recharge excess water for firming obligations. Other Community surface water deliveries are 
more assured, as per the Globe Equity and Haggard Decrees. The settlement side agreements 
increase the surety of these surface water supplies through the Upper Gila River Maintenance 
Area and the CUFA. 
3.3.e. Firming
The outcome of reallocating M&I water to M&I uses rather than to tribal settlements resulted in a 
compromise to firm equivalent volumes for such settlements so that tribal water can be delivered 
during shortages as if it were M&I priority water (see Section 2ic above). This was an innovative 
solution to what had become a vexing and contentious issue between the State and the Federal 
negotiators. The firming volumes and division of responsibilities are detailed in Title I, Sec 105. 
A consequence of dividing firming responsibilities by water quantity (rather than dividing up 
costs of a single firming program) is that federal and state agencies may compete for excess water 
and aquifer space. This is perhaps somewhat more problematic for the federal side as the State 
has got a head start on the process because of the necessity to pass new legislation148 to address 
several components of the federal legislation.149 This new legislation created a Firming Program 
Study Commission150 which modeled shortages on the Colorado River to estimate the firming 
145
 The modeling assumptions used by the State can be found in Appendix II of the Indian Firming Study 
Commission, Interim Report, Draft 10-06-05. Available from 
http://www.awba.state.az.us/annc/Indian_Firming_Study_Comm/default.htm, accessed May 6, 2006.
146
 Exhibit 9.1, Sec 5.1.3. Sec 5.2 sets the terms of the delivery of this water at $18.5/AF, of which 
$13.5/AF is for transportation of the water, this charge will be adjusted for inflation and a $5/AF charge for 
pumping, which will be adjusted with power and energy rates.
147
 Pre-settlement the GRIC were subject to an 185 KAFY shortfall in its Globe Equity decreed water.
148
 Pub. L. 108-451, Title II, Sec 207(c)(1)(I)(ii).
149
 HB 2728.
150
 The Study Commission was established per Appendix III, HB 2728, Section 12, to investigate firming 
volumes, options to meet the obligation including costs and funding sources, and identifying necessary 
changes to Arizona Revised Statutes.
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volume required,151 estimated the costs of various options, and made recommendations including 
changes to law. This firming legislation was adopted by the Arizona legislature in March 2006.152
The outcome is that new authorities and duties have been identified for the AWBA and these 
have been codified into the AWBA statutes.153 An interesting outcome of the State firming 
program is the creation of a groundwater savings facility (GSF)154 on the GRIC reservation.155
This GSF has permitted the direct delivery of CAP water in lieu of a portion of the State’s firming 
obligation. This facility reduces the cost of water banking for the State and makes water available 
for the tribe earlier, water that will be used for agricultural purposes. Incidentally, it has also 
increased recharge capacity in the State.
3.4. Access to water infrastructure
A key benefit for the Community and the Federal government in this settlement is access to water 
conveyance and storage infrastructure: infrastructure that in many cases was built by the federal 
government. This access does three things: it allows the Community to quickly ramp up its water 
use, it reduces the costs of the agreement to the Federal government, and it is an in-kind 
contribution to the settlement from state parties. For example, GRIC can use the RWCD system 
to transport water to the northern boundary of the reservation subject to 30 cubic feet per second 
(CFS) capacity restrictions.156 This capacity is equivalent to 21,719 AFY, making it significantly 
greater than the RWCD surface water reallocation to the Community. Furthermore, RWCD will 
pay all the capital and OM&R costs of making the capacity available to the Community.157
Additionally, the RWCD will undertake to increase the capacity of the system to 200 CFS 
(equivalent to 144,794 AFY) to provide for future additional deliveries to the Reservation. All 
costs, including OM&R costs, associated with the expanded system will be borne by the U.S..158
The Community also has agreements with SRP for the direct delivery of CAP water to the 
Reservation using SRP infrastructure.159 The benefits accruing to the Community from these 
arrangements are hard to quantify. Clearly they are significant in terms of delivering wet water 
and also in reducing the cost of implementing the overall agreement by using existing 
infrastructure.
151 The firming volume used by the Study Commission was 548,770 AF. [Reclamation, the lead Federal 
agency in charge of the firming for Title III estimates that firming the 28.2 KAFY will require a firming 
obligation of 846 KAF. Using Reclamation’s calculations the State’s firming requirement is much higher at 
711.7KAF]. See also footnote 149.
152
 HB 2835.
153
 These changes make the AWBA the State’s agent for firming. The Statutes also identifies State general 
funds and a portion of groundwater withdrawal fees in the Phoenix, Pinal and Tucson Active Management 
Areas (AMAs) to pay for the program A.R.S. §45-611(C)(1)-(3). Other duties include developing 
accounting mechanisms for tracking firming. The Statutes also identify water sources that can be used for 
Indian firming, these include effluent, which is not permissible for other types of firming, however, the 
legislation still prioritizes the use of CAP excess water, to comply with priorities to fully utilize the CAP. 
Finally the AWBA is permitted to direct deliver firming water to the GRIC. See next footnote.
154
 A GSF works by conserving groundwater through the direct delivery of an alternative water source as a 
replacement for groundwater pumping.
155
 Agreement between the Arizona Water Banking Authority, and Gila River Indian community for 
Storage of Central Arizona Project Water at a Groundwater Savings Facility, April 2006. The facility has 
been permitted for up to 56 KAFY.
156
 Exhibit 9.1, paras 5.3 and 6.1. This option is for all water sources not just the RWCD portion of the 
water budget.
157
 Id. at para 6.1.
158
 Id at para 6.3 and subparas 6.3 (c) and (d).
159
 GRIC WRSA, para 14.1, for delivery of up to 4 KAF per month or 20 KAFY (subpara 14.3.2.) for 
which the Community will pay the same charges as in footnote 143. SRP ditches are also available to the 
Community as per subpara 16.9.
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4. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
The AWSA brought together the dominant water stakeholders in central Arizona across tribal, 
state, federal, municipal and agricultural interests. This negotiation process itself is as significant, 
involving years of dialogue among hundreds of individuals and legal representatives. Important 
regional water management measures were incorporated into the agreement, a commendable 
outcome of complex negotiations. It is conceivable that similar water management goals could 
have been achieved more cheaply or efficiently in other ways, for example through new measures 
to control private wells or to improve agricultural water efficiency. The proliferation of side 
agreements makes it challenging to track the flows of water and money among parties and to 
clearly identify consequences of the AWSA. However this is critical in understanding the 
distribution of costs and benefits. Given the pre-existing challenges of rapid growth, variable 
surface supplies and spatially dis-connected pumping and replenishment activities it is 
remarkable that the AWSA achieved so much. The effort and expense that went into the AWSA 
is, of course, in large part due to the location of the GRIC Reservation and the size of the 
settlement. Improvements in water supply reliability are shared with other water rights holders 
who are reliant on the same watersheds. 
Total costs of the settlement comprise monies expended in negotiation, money pledged for 
various funds and administrative activities, in-kind water costs, and opportunity costs. 
Settlements have proven expensive to negotiate and implement. However, they defuse litigation, 
bind parties to make durable solutions, and deliver wet water to tribes. The Congressional Budget 
Office estimates that the AWSA will increase federal discretionary spending by $6M in the years 
2005-2009 and increase direct spending by $445M in the years 2005-2014.160 Meanwhile, the 
State has, and will continue to, provide resources for studies, legislative amendments, oversight 
and monitoring, and enforcement. The State must also contribute $3M for Federal firming, in 
cash or in-kind. State firming obligations using a traditional AWBA approach are estimated to
cost between $25.35M and $53.48M.161 The Southside Replenishment District costs are estimated 
at $0.3M.162 The AWBA also expects to hire one full-time staff person to assist in these program 
activities.163 Other costs are to the Settling Parties, estimated at around $78.06M.164 There are of 
course other costs, such as costs to enforce the new legislation and the opportunity costs of new 
water, after the large reallocation to the GRIC; however, this cost could be negative, if Indian 
water leases are less expensive than the next alternative water source.
The sources of water for the agreement are almost evenly split between federal and (state) 
Settling Parties. The federal portion includes the 102 KAFY CAP NIA water, 18 KAFY 
conserved in the upper Gila Valley, and an unspecified volume of water from CUFA. On the state 
160 Supra note 25, p1.
161
 Indian Firming Study Commission, Interim Report, November 1, 2005. Appendix VII. The lower bound 
estimate is for a groundwater savings facility (GSF) and the higher bound for underground storage facility 
(USF). A USF facility (A.R.S. § 45-811.01) allows the permit holder to operate a facility that stores water 
in the aquifer.  A GSF facility (A.R.S. § 45-812.01) allows the permit holder to deliver a renewable water 
supply, called "in-lieu" water, to a recipient who agrees to replace groundwater pumping with in lieu water, 
thus creating a groundwater savings. Other solutions were estimated to be more costly, such as dry year 
fallowing, at $88.16M.
162
 The direct delivery of CAP water to fulfill this obligation reduces the cost of this program. Using current 
AWBA rates of $20/AF the total cost of this program is around $300,000.
163
 As per discussion with AWBA staff on November, 15, 2005.
164
 This is not a complete list. The $78.06M includes city lease costs (for which the lessess receive water). 
This upfront money has an opportunity cost. The $78.06M also includes Phelps-Dodge’s compensation 
money, lease cost and 20-year option, SRP payments for easements, and Tucson Water’s $300K subsidence 
fund.
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side, SRP contributed 20.5 KAFY stored water and 5.9 KAFY in lieu of Haggard Decree water, 
RWCD and HVID contributed 36.7 KAFY CAP NIA water, RWCD also contributed 4.5 KAFY 
of surface water, Asarco 17 KAFY of CAP M&I priority water, and the cities of Mesa and 
Chandler a total 12.6 KAFY treated effluent, for a total 97.2 KAFY. The contributions from the 
Settling Parties reduced the overall cost of the settlement for the federal government in line with 
Federal criteria.
Opportunity costs are harder to quantify. These are the costs associated with reallocating water to 
GRIC that could have been allocated to current and future competing uses. There may also be 
opportunity costs in terms of future settlements. To the extent that water settlements are a zero-
sum game the GRIC settlement was the recipient of significant federal indirect and direct funds 
and within Arizona a large fraction of outstanding excess water has been reallocated to the GRIC.
Undeniably all parties to the settlement (and many non-signatories) benefit from the settlement. 
However, it is hard to quantify some of these benefits. The main benefit is the removal of risk and 
uncertainty associated with the GRIC water claim. Twenty cities also gained access to new 
allocations of AWS water and four cities to inexpensive lease water. The benefits to individual 
signatories vary. Signatories and non-signatories also benefit from third-party effects, for 
example from upstream water forbearance agreements. The Community meanwhile benefits from 
the delivery of ‘wet’ water and the economic development, cultural, and environmental 
opportunities afforded by water resources. The Federal government benefits by fulfilling its trust 
obligation and both the federal and state governments benefit by resolving contentious CAP 
issues and introducing water management improvements. This agreement may also benefit other 
Indian tribes: 67 KAFY and $250M was set aside to facilitate other settlements. It is difficult to 
monetize these combined benefits or allocate them between various participants, however, the 
OMB’s reluctance to endorse the agreement suggests that the costs to the federal government 
might exceed estimated “calculable legal exposure”. This contention paradoxically is one of the 
reasons why the agreement may prove to be durable. 
Many settlements incorporate penalty provisions in the event the federal government does not 
meet its obligations in a timely manner. The GRIC settlement does not: this is attributable to the 
source of implementation funding, the LCRBD fund, and not more discretionary annual federal 
appropriations. However, even without such penalties, the Settling Parties have enormous 
incentives to ensure the durability of the settlement, particularly as this settlement includes money
and water and also lease provisions for the reallocation of this water from the Community to the 
Settling Parties. It is unclear whether the AWSA will be a precedent for future settlements as it is 
the largest settlement in the United State’s history and therefore costly. There is a provision in the 
AWSA to keep Congress informed about the status of settlement implementation, negotiations for 
future settlements,165 and identification of critical on-Reservation water needs.166 This creates a 
potential window of opportunity for other Arizona tribes to negotiate settlements. However there 
are new political and financial realities at the federal level that create obstacles for such 
settlements. Nevertheless, the agreement does contain elements that could be adopted in other 
settlements such as watershed forbearance agreements, cost sharing with Settling Parties, access 
to water conveyance and storage infrastructure, the “bought-down” water price model, and 
matching water quality with use.
165 The San Carlos Apaches, Navajos and Hopis are all currently negotiating.
166
 Pub. L. 108-451, Title I Sec 104(a)((1)(C).
